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Antitrust’s State Action Doctrine and the Ordinary Powers of Corporations
Herbert Hovenkamp*

Corporations chartered under state law have many of the powers of ordinary
persons, including the powers to make contracts, to own property, to buy and sell, to
enter into joint ventures, supplier or distribution agreements. Municipal corporations
and other governmental subdivisions may be granted a similar array of powers. Not
only do most corporations have these powers in common with natural persons, but just
as natural persons they also operate under the constraint that they may not use them
unlawfully. For example, a biological person’s “natural” power to enter a contract1 does
not confer the power to enter a contract in restraint of trade that would be prohibited by
section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 A corporation has this power only if it is explicitly
granted. But by the same token, one should never infer from the mere fact that a
corporation was authorized to enter into contracts that it was authorized to engage in
price fixing or anticompetitive boycotts.
At the same time, antitrust law’s “state action” doctrine permits the states to
regulate and even to “authorize” anticompetitive conduct, provided that they state their
intention to do so clearly3 and that they also actively supervise any private conduct that

*

Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa.
In fact, federal statutes convey to at least some natural persons the right to make contracts
or transact in property. See 42 U.S.C. §1981 (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right …to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white
persons….”); 42 U.S.C. §1982 (similar: “same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens … to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property”).
2
15 U.S.C. §1.
3
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Alum., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (the
challenged restraint must be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy”), interpreting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Cf. Community Communications
Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982) (refusing to infer “clear articulation” from a
generalized “home rule” provision that gave municipality power to regulate within its
boundaries); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conf., Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 62-63
1
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results from the regulatory scheme. Most courts understand that stating this
authorization clearly means that the legislature must have contemplated approval of an
action that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws and decided to authorize it anyway.
As the Supreme Court has indicated, one uses an objective test and considers whether
the challenged conduct was a “foreseeable” consequence of the legislation for which
authorization is claimed.4 Thus, for example, if an agency that was properly authorized
under state law reviewed and approved a merger, then federal courts may be required
to stand aside.5
A few courts have carried the idea of “authorization” much further, however,
concluding that authorizing a firm to engage in its ordinary corporate activities, such as
contracting or acquiring assets, also operates to authorize conduct that would otherwise
be unlawful under the antitrust laws. This reasoning is incorrect for a number of
reasons. First, the states’ own antitrust laws almost invariably make clear that by
authorizing firms to “contract” or “acquire,” they did not mean to authorize
anticompetitive acquisitions.6 Second, inferring a state action immunity from ordinary
corporate powers creates a virtual blanket antitrust exemption for most of the activities
engaged in by most American business corporations. For example, virtually all
business corporations are “authorized” by corporate law to make contracts, to own
property, or to acquire assets, including the assets or equity of other corporations.
Collectively this group of powers runs across the full range of potential antitrust
violations, from price-fixing agreements to tying and exclusive dealing, boycott
agreements, mergers, and most instances of anticompetitive exclusion. Indeed, it

(1985) (authorization for agencies to engage in rate making did not of itself authorize collective
rate making).
4
City of Columbia & Columbia Outdoor Advertising v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499
U.S. 365, 372-373 (1991); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985). See 1
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶222-227 (3d ed. 2007).
5
E.g., FTC v. Equitable Resources, Inc., 512 F.Supp.2d 361 (W.D.Pa. 2007) (finding both
clear state articulation of intent to place control of gas mergers under state public utility board,
and active supervision of the result).
6
See 14 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶2415 (3d ed. 2012) (in press).
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would overrule a great many Supreme Court decisions in which the challenged conduct
was lawful as a matter of state corporate law.7
“Authorization” in the context of antitrust’s state action immunity has two
meanings; the first is state authority to do the act. The second is state intent to permit
the relevant actor to act anticompetitively, and thus to displace the antitrust laws. A
statute giving a quasi-government entity the power to “execute contracts” covers only
the first category. Surely no state court would conclude that a simple authorization of
state corporations to enter into contracts justified contracting that involved unlawful race
discrimination, fraud, or embezzlement, or even state law antitrust violations.
In its en banc Hammond decision the Fifth Circuit recognized these different
meanings of authorization, concluding that the Louisiana legislature did not make
sufficiently clear its intent to insulate hospitals acting under its authority from antitrust
liability.8 The defendant, a dominant surgical hospital, pressured health plans and
others to give it exclusive rights, thus injuring the plaintiff's development of its rival acute
care facility. The district court had granted a motion to dismiss, inferring the power to
enter exclusive contracts from the statutory power to contract and enter joint ventures.
That statute provided:
7

E.g., Amerian Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010) (collusion involving incorporated
football teams and incorporated NFL property owner); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands
Skiing corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (monopolization against incorporated dominant firm).
8
Surgical Care Center of Hammond v. Hospital Serv. Dist., 171 F.3d 231 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 964 (1999). Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a finding that the antitrust
laws had not been violated. See 309 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2002). See also Shames v. California
Travel and Tourism Com’n, 626 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (authorization to rental car companies
to “pass on” certain fees to customers did not imply authorization for their collusive agreement
about how much was to be passed on); First Am. Title Co. v. DeVaugh, 480 F.3d 438 (6th Cir.
2007) (state action immunity did not shield county registries of deeds from claim that they
monopolized the market for land title documents by conditioning copying on purchaser's promise
not to sell certified copies to third parties, which made it hard for third-party title plants to
maintain duplicate land records; state statutes in question gave the registries the power to make
contracts, and a limited monopoly to the extent that they received transaction information from
the original parties to a land transaction, recorded it, and retained possession of official title
documents; but there was no authorization for a restraint on resale of copies of such documents);
Capital City Cab Service, Inc. v. Susquehanna Area Reg. Airport Authority, 470 F. Supp. 2d 462
(M.D. Pa. 2006) (mere power to contract not sufficient authorization for allegedly
anticompetitive exclusive contract).
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In addition to the powers and duties otherwise provided and notwithstanding any
other law to the contrary, the board of commissioners of a hospital service district
and any corporation or health facility owned or operated by such district or
commission may contract with or engage in a joint venture with any person,
corporation, partnership, or group of persons to offer, provide, promote, establish, or
sell any hospital health service.9

This conclusion was not undermined by the fact that the state statutes authorized
“any person, corporation, partnership, or group of persons,” to “sell any hospital health
service” and that this power was granted “notwithstanding any other law to the
contrary.”10 The court refused to conclude from this last statement that “any other law”
included the Sherman Act—that is, that the legislature by this ambiguous provision had
“clearly articulated” a policy of permitting non-sovereign actors to engage in
anticompetitive conduct.11 The court then concluded that it would not infer:

a policy to displace competition from naked grants of authority. These are the
enabling statutes by which myriad instruments of local government across the
country gain basic corporate powers. To infer a policy to displace competition from,
for example, authority to enter into joint ventures or other business forms would
stand federalism on its head. A state would henceforth be required to disclaim
affirmatively antitrust immunity, at the peril of creating an instrument of local
government with power the state did not intend to grant. The immediate practical
effect would be the extension of the Parker principle downward, contrary to the
teaching that local instruments of government are subject to the Sherman Act. 12
9

LSA-R.S. 46:1077 (emphasis added).
Ibid.
11
Ibid. Accord Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital District, 940
F.2d 397, 403 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992) (““when there are abundant
indications that a state's policy is to support competition, a subordinate state entity must do more
than merely produce an authorization to ‘do business' to show that the state's policy is to displace
competition.” ).
12
Hammond, 171 F.3d at 236.
10
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Other decisions have too quickly inferred a state policy of permitting
anticompetitive conduct from a highly general grant of corporate power. For example,
one court granted immunity to an exclusive contract between a municipal hospital and
an anesthesiology group because the authorizing statute gave the hospital Board “full,
absolute and complete” authority to manage its business affairs, including “the
execution of all contracts.”13 Giving an agency the power to make its own contracts
hardly contemplates authorization for the agency to make anticompetitive contracts.14

Of course, in many of these cases there was very likely no antitrust violation in
the first place. But using the state action doctrine as a way to dispose of weak antitrust
claims is bad for two reasons. First, it fails to distinguish competitive from
anticompetitive conduct and thus fails to engage the state’s true policy with respect to
competition. Second, once a particular provision has been found to authorize a
particular instance of conduct that same provision may be used in future cases to infer
authorization of conduct that is more competitively harmful. For example, once a court
has held that the power to make contracts immunizes a hospital’s harmless exclusive
dealing agreement15 it may be hard pressed to explain why the same very general
statute does not authorize naked horizontal price fixing. Undoubtedly, many decisions
inferring a broad immunity from general corporate powers are driven by the belief that

13

Scara v. Bradley Memorial Hosp., 1993-2 Trade Cas. ¶70,353 (E.D. Tenn.). See also
Martin v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996) (municipal hospital's
exclusive contract with physician to supervise kidney disease center was foreseeable
consequence of state statute authorizing such hospitals to contract for the provision of services,
including entering management contracts, but not explicitly stating that such contracts could be
exclusive); Jackson, Tennessee Hospital Co., LLC v. West Tennessee Healthcare, Inc., 2004-1
Trade Cas. ¶74,344, 2004 WL 547215 (Feb. 27, 2004) (authority to enter into contracts with
physicians implied authority to enter into anticompetitive agreements).
14
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
15
E.g., Martin v. Memorial Hospital at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996) (municipal
hospital's exclusive contract with physician to supervise kidney disease center was foreseeable
consequence of state statute authorizing such hospitals to contract for the provision of services,
including entering management contracts, but not explicitly stating that such contracts could be
exclusive);
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no antitrust violation has occurred. But in that case the proper solution is dismissal on
the antitrust merits.
Also incorrect are cases concluding that the power to acquire intellectual property
rights implies the power to commit patent misuse or antitrust violations based on abuse
of intellectual property rights. For example, one decision held that a statute authorizing
a university to acquire and manage assets, including intellectual property, implicitly
authorized the university to acquire an exclusive patent license by fraud.16 Once again,
there may have been no antitrust violation, but lack of violation does not yield state
action immunity. Others have inferred an antitrust immunity for anticompetitive
exclusive contracts from a broad grant of the power to contract.17 On situations in the
last class, the power to contract certainly implies the power to enter into at least some
exclusive provider agreements, for the great majority of such agreements are lawful. But
one would not assume without additional clarification that such authority included the
power to enter into the occasionally unlawful, anticompetitive agreement. In sum, the
corporation relying on the ordinary corporate grant of the power to contract faces the
same set of antitrust risks as any contractor – namely, a duty to avoid the occasional
anticompetitive contract.
Equally problematic are decisions holding or suggesting that the power to buy and
sell property implies the power to enter into otherwise unlawful mergers. 18 Nearly all
state chartered business corporations have the power to buy and sell property, including
corporate equities or assets. Nevertheless, the Clayton Act expressly forbids any
“person” from merging unlawfully, and makes clear that “person” includes
16

Recombinant DNA Technology & Patent Contract Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Ind.
1994). The statute authorized the university to “acquire by grant, purchase, gift, devise, lease, or
by the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and … hold, use, sell, lease, or dispose of any
real or personal property necessary for the full exercise or convenient or useful for the carrying
on of any of its powers.…”
17
Cf. Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. City of Bossier City, 2 F. Supp. 2d 842 (W.D. La.
1997), rev'd, 178 F.3d 1290 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 527 U.S. 1065 (1999) (district court
concludes that state statute authorizing municipal hospitals to make contracts with providers and
develop their own strategic plans contemplated that hospital would enter exclusive arrangements
with physician providers; Fifth Circuit reverses without opinion).
18
FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Directors of Lee Cty., 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994) (public
hospital's acquisition immune; statute authorizing Board to create a hospital and acquire
additional assets as needed appeared to contemplate acquisition of a second hospital).
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corporations.19 Already in its very first merger decision on the merits, the Northern
Securities case, the Supreme Court held that the fact that the challenged acquisition
had been authorized by a state corporation law the permitted one firm to acquire
another did not serve to immunize the acquisition from antitrust attack. 20

In Phoebe Putney the Eleventh Circuit held that the state action doctrine foreclosed
an FTC challenge to a hospital merger that was alleged to be anticompetitive.21 The
Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision.

The authorizing provision that the court found decisive in Phoebe Putney provided
that:

Every hospital authority shall be deemed to exercise public and essential
governmental functions and shall have all the powers necessary or
convenient to carry out and effectuate the purposes and provisions of this
article, including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the
following powers:

(1) To sue and be sued;

(2) To have a seal and alter the same;

(3) To make and execute contracts and other instruments necessary to
exercise the powers of the authority;

19

See 15 U.S.C. §§12, 18.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345-346 (1904).
21
F.T.C. v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc. 663 F.3d 1369 (Dec. 2011), cert. granted, 2012 WL
985316, 80 USLW 3564 (June 25, 2012). The state of Georgia also opposed the merger. See
Brief of State of Georgia in further Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 2011 WL
3920707 (M.D.Ga. June 14, 2011). Cf. Palmyra Park Hosp., Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Memorial
Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2010) (permitting tying claim against hospital but not hospital
authority because claim against latter had been abandoned).
20
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(4) To acquire by purchase, lease, or otherwise and to operate projects;….22

The provision said nothing about anticompetitive mergers that might violate federal
antitrust laws. Further, the powers that the statute authorized were powers typically held
by any business corporation and many governmental subdivisions. While the hospital
authority was for at least some purposes treated as a government subdivision, the
Supreme Court has made clear that only the federal government and the “state itself” have
sovereignty; as a result, subdivisions must be authorized.23 Other subdivisions, including
municipalities, have only those powers that the state authorizes for them.

In finding immunity the court reasoned:
…the Georgia legislature must have anticipated anticompetitive harm when it
authorized hospital acquisitions by the authorities. It defies imagination to
suppose the legislature could have believed that every geographic market in
Georgia was so replete with hospitals that authorizing acquisitions by the
authorities could have no serious anticompetitive consequences. The legislature
could hardly have thought that Georgia's more rural markets could support so
many hospitals that acquisitions by an authority would not harm competition. We
therefore conclude that, through the Hospital Authorities Law, the Georgia
legislature clearly articulated a policy authorizing the displacement of
competition.24
The court appeared to assume that by stating no exceptions the statute meant to
authorize all mergers without regard for federal antitrust law. A more logical reading is
that the statute gave the hospital districts the power to make acquisitions, provided that
these acquisitions were not unlawful on other grounds. For example, the Georgia
Business Corporation Code, just as other state corporation statutes, grants state

22

23

O.C.G.A., §31-7-70, 75.

Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982) (municipality;
general grant of regulatory authority to municipality did not contemplate anticompetitive action).
24
663 F.3d at 1377.
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corporations the right to acquire the stock or assets of other corporations.25 The same
statute authorizes Georgia corporations to own and convey real property26 and to enter
contracts.27 None of these authorizations is accompanied by an express limitation that
these acts may be performed only when they are consistent with antitrust law, criminal
law, or any other body of law. Nevertheless, those limitations are uniformly read in by
implication, and would not create an immunity for either anticompetitive mergers or price
fixing. Thus it hardly seems the case that a “foreseeable result” of the power to make
an acquisition is a power to make an anticompetitive acquisition.28

The court relied on its previous Lee County decision, which had also rejected an
FTC merger challenge on state action grounds.29 In that case when state had passed
the authorizing statute in question, one of its purposes was to authorize a hospital board
to acquire the “only hospital then in existence in Lee County…, giving it 100% of the
market share at that time.”30 From this the Phoebe Putney court concluded that the
legislature must have contemplated that the statute would authorize mergers to
monopoly.

What the court failed to see, however, was that the initial acquisition in the Lee
County case was not a merger to monopoly at all. The hospital in that case had a 100%
share to begin with, and the statute did no more than facilitate the transfer of this
hospital from its previous owners to the new hospital authority.31 Transferring a

25

O.C.G.A., Tit. 14, §14-2-1102; see also id. at §14-2-1105 (governing plans of merger or
share exchange).
26
Id., §14-5-7.
27
Id., §14-3-845.
28
The Georgia Code also provides that “The immunity from antitrust liability afforded to
local governments by the provisions of Code Sections 36-65-1 and 36-65-2 shall not apply to
public providers in the offering and providing of services as defined in this chapter; and public
providers shall be subject to applicable antitrust liabilities….”
29
FTC v. Hospital Bd. Of Directors of Lee County, 38 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 1994).
30

Id. at 1186.
See Lee County, 38 F.3d at 1192:
In 1963, when the Board was originally created, there was only one hospital in existence in Lee
County. Pursuant to the powers given it, the Board acquired the hospital, creating a monopoly. In
1987, the legislature, with the knowledge that it had given the Board the power to create a monopoly
31
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hospital with a 100% market share from one owner to another does not “create” a
monopoly but merely reassigns its ownership. By contrast, subsequent acquisitions
after multiple hospitals existed in the area would lessen competition. That is,.a merger
to monopoly requires the union of two (or more) independent units into one. Thus by
approving it the state legislature expressed no opinion whatsoever on the creation of
monopoly by merger, or for that matter any other merger that threatened to lessen
competition.
Conclusion
Federal antitrust policy’s commitment to federalism is strong – so strong, in fact,
that it permits states to immunize almost any kind of intrastate conduct, provided that
they state their wishes clearly and do not permit private actors to hijack the process. At
the same time, however, the inference is strong that the states have a commitment to
the maintenance of competition – attested by the fact that nearly every state has an
antitrust law of its own, most of them modeled on the Sherman Act. For that reason the
presumption must be strong that before state action immunity will be granted the state
must assert with clarity that this was the policy it intended.

in 1963, further expanded the implicit power of the Board to acquire other hospitals. Thus, if the
legislature knew at the time it expanded the Board's acquisition powers in 1987 that a monopoly had
resulted from the 1963 legislation, the legislature must have reasonably anticipated that further
acquisitions, resulting from the 1987 legislation, would increase the Board's market share in an
anticompetitive manner.

